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Abstract
In this paper we use techniques of Malliavin calculus and forward integration to present
a general stochastic maximum principle for anticipating stochastic differential equations
driven by a Le´vy type of noise. We apply our result to study a general stochastic differ-
ential game problem of an insider.
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1 Introduction
In real world, market agents have access to different levels of information and it is important
to understand what value particular pieces of information have. This paper is devoted to the
study of a class of two-player stochastic differential game in which the players have different
information on the payoff. The different agents invest different amounts of capital in order to
optimize their utility. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash-
equilibria for this game and characterize these for various levels of information asymmetry.
The framework is the one of stochastic differential game with anticipative strategy sets.
In the following, let {Bs}0≤s≤T be a Brownian motion and N˜(dz, ds) = N(dz, ds)−dsν(dz) be
a compensated Poisson random measure associated with a Le´vy process with Le´vy measure
ν on the (complete) filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T , P ). In the sequel, we assume
that the Le´vy measure ν fulfills ∫
R0
z2 ν(dz) <∞,
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where R0 := R\ {0} .
Suppose that the state process X(t) = X(u)(t, ω); t ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω is a controlled Itoˆ-Le´vy
process in R of the form:
d−X(t) = b(t,X(t), u0(t), ω) dt + σ(t,X(t), u0(t), ω) d−B(t)
+
∫
R0 γ(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), z, ω) N˜(dz, d
−t);
X(0) = x ∈ R
(1.1)
Where the coefficients b : [0, T ] × R × U × Ω −→ R, σ : [0, T ] × R × U × Ω −→ R, and
γ : [0, T ]×R×U ×K ×R0×Ω −→ R are measurable functions, where U ⊂ R2, K ⊂ R×R0
are given open convex sets. Here we consider filtrations
{Git}t∈[0,T ] , i = 1, 2 such that
Ft ⊂ Git ⊂ FT , t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2, (1.2)
representing the information available to the controller at time t.
Since B(t) and N˜(dz, dt) need not to be a semimartingale with respect to {Git}t≥0, i = 1, 2,
the two last integrals in (1.1) are anticipating stochastic integrals that we interpret as forward
integrals.
The control processes u0(t) and u1(t, z) with values in given open convex sets U and K
respectively for a.a t ∈ [0, T ] , z ∈ R0 are called admissible controls if (1.1) has a unique
(strong) solution X = X(u0,u1) such that the components of u0(·) and u1(·, ·) are adapted to
the considered filtrations
{G1t }t∈[0,T ] and {G2t }t∈[0,T ] respectively.
Let f : [0, T ]×R×U ×K ×Ω −→ R and g : R×Ω −→ R be given measurable functions and
the given performance functionals for players are as follows:
Ji(u0, u1) := Ex
[∫ T
0
fi(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), ω)µ(dz)dt + gi(X(T ), ω)
]
, i = 1, 2, (1.3)
where µ is a measure on the given measurable space (Ω,FT ) and Ex = ExP = E denotes the
expectation with respect to P given that X(0) = x. Suppose that the controls u0(t) and
u1(t, z) have the form
u0(t) = (pi0(t), θ0(t)) ; t ∈ [0, T ] , (1.4)
u1(t, z) = (pi1(t, z), θ1(t)) ; t ∈ [0, T ]× R0. (1.5)
Let AΠ (respectively AΘ) denote the given family of controls pi = (pi0, pi1) (respectively
θ = (θ0, θ1)) such that they are contained in the set of G1t -adapted controls (respectively
G2t -adapted controls), (1.1) has a unique strong solution up to time T and
Ex
[∫ T
0
|fi(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), ω)| µ(dz)dt + |gi(X(T ), ω)|
]
<∞, i = 1, 2.
The insider information non-zero-sum stochastic differential game problem we analyze is the
following:
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Problem 1.1 Find (pi∗, θ∗) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ (if it exists) such that
1. J1 (pi, θ∗) ≤ J1 (pi∗, θ∗) for all pi ∈ AΠ
2. J2 (pi∗, θ) ≤ J2 (pi∗, θ∗) for all θ ∈ AΘ
The pair (pi∗, θ∗) is called a Nash Equilibrium (if it exists). The intuitive idea is that there
are two players, Player I and Player II. While Player I controls pi, Player II controls θ. Each
player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has
anything to gain by changing only his or her own strategy (i.e., by changing unilaterally).
Player I and Player II are in Nash Equilibrium if each player is making the best decision
she can, taking into account the other player’s decision. Note that since we allow b, σ, γ,
f and g to be stochastic processes and since our controls are also G1t -adapted (respectively
G2t -adapted), this problem is not of Markovian type and hence cannot be embedded into the
framework of dynamic programming.
Our paper is inspired by ideas developed by Di Nunno et al in [10] and, An et al in [2], where
the authors use Malliavin calculus to derive a general maximum principle for anticipative
stochastic control and a general maximum principle for stochastic differential games with
partial information, respectively. The paper focus on the conditions on the enlarged filtra-
tion to obtain the non-existence of an optimal insider game. Our paper covers the insider
case in [11], since we include jumps in the risky asset model and we deal with controls being
adapted to general supfiltrations of the underlying reference filtration. Moreover, our Malli-
avin calculus approach to stochastic differential games with insider information for Itoˆ-Le´vy
processes allows for optimization of very general performance functionals. We apply our re-
sults to a worst case scenario portfolio problem in finance under additional information. We
show that there does not exist a Nash-equilibrium for the insider. We prove that there exists
a Nash-equilibrium insider consumption, and in some special cases the optimal solution can
be expressed explicitly.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we recall some basic concepts of forward
integration. In Section 3, we derive a general maximum principle for insider stochastic dif-
ferential game control problem using Malliavin calculus. In Section 4, the Itoˆ-Le´vy pro-
cesses are considered. Finally in Section 5 and 6, we apply our results to study optimal and
competing-insider control problem and optimal and competing-insider consumption problem.
The Appendix is devoted to the proof of our main Theorem (Theorem 3.2).
2 Forward integrals
In this Section we briefly review some basic concepts of forward integration theory and
its relation to Malliavin calculus, which we will use in the forthcoming sections. We refer
to [13, 18, 21, 22] and [6] for more information about these forward integrations. As for
Malliavin calculus the reader may consult [8] or [17].
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2.1 Forward integral for B(·)
We recall the forward integral with respect to the Brownian motion. Let B(t) be a Brownian
motion on a filtered probability space (Ω,F ,Ft≥0, P ), and T > 0 a fixed horizon.
Definition 2.1 Let φ : [0, T ] × Ω → R be a measurable process. The forward integral of φ
with respect to B(·) is defined by∫ T
0
φ(t, ω) d−B(t) = lim
→0
∫ T
0
φ(t, ω)
B(t+ )−B(t)

dt, (2.1)
if the limit exist in probability, in which case φ is called forward integrable.
Note that if φ is ca`dla`g and forward integrable, then∫ T
0
φ(t, ω) d−B(t) = lim
∆t→0
∑
j
φ(tj)∆B(tj). (2.2)
where the sum is taken over the points of a finite partition of [0, T ].
Denote by Dt the Malliavin derivative in the direction of B(t) and by DB1,2 the stochastic
Sobolev space with the norm ‖·‖1,2 given by
‖F‖1,2 =
(
‖F‖L2(µ) + E
[∫ T
0
|DtF |2
]) 1
2
.
See [8] or [17] for definitions and further results.
Definition 2.2 Let MB denote the set of stochastic functions φ : [0, T ]× Ω→ R such that:
1. φ ∈ L2 ([0, T ]× Ω), u(t) ∈ DB1,2 for almost all t and satisfies
E
(∫ T
0
|φ(t)|2 dt +
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
|Duφ(t)|2 dudt
)
<∞ .
We will denoted by L1,2 [0, T ] the class of such processes.
2. lim→0 1
∫ u
u− φ(t)dt = φ(u) for a.a u ∈ [0, T ] in L1,2[0, T ],
3. Dt+φ(t) := lims→t+Dsφ(t) exists in L1((0, T )⊗ Ω) uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ].
We let MB1,2 be the closure of the linear span of MB with respect to the norm given by
‖φ‖MB1,2 := ‖φ‖L1,2[0,T ] + ‖Dt+φ(t)‖L1((0,T )⊗Ω)
Then we have the relation between the forward integral and the Skorohod integral (see [15, 8]):
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Lemma 2.3 If φ ∈MB1,2 then it is forward integrable and∫ T
0
φ(t)d−B(t) =
∫ T
0
φ(t)δB(t) +
∫ T
0
Dt+φ(t)dt . (2.3)
Moreover
E
[∫ T
0
φ(t)d−B(t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
Dt+φ(t)dt
]
. (2.4)
Using (2.3) and the duality formula for the Malliavin derivative Dt see e.g. [8], one deduces
the following result.
Corollary 2.4 Suppose φ ∈MB1,2 and F ∈ DB1,2 then
E
[
F
∫ T
0
φ(t)d−B(t)
]
= E
[
F
∫ T
0
φ(t)δB(t) + F
∫ T
0
Dt+φ(t)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
φ(t)DtF dt +
∫ T
0
F Dt+φ(t)dt
]
, (2.5)
where
∫ T
0 φ(t)δB(t) denotes the Skorohod integral w.r.t B(t).
2.2 Forward integral for N˜(·, ·)
We give the forward integral with respect to the compensated Poisson random measure N˜ .
Definition 2.5 The forward integral
J(φ) :=
∫ T
0
∫
R0
φ(t, z)N˜(dz, d−t) ,
with respect to the Poisson random measure N˜ , of a ca`dla`g stochastic function φ(t, z), t ∈
[0, T ] , z ∈ R, with φ(t, z) = φ(ω, t, z), ω ∈ Ω,is defined as
J(φ) = lim
m→∞
∫ T
0
∫
R
φ(t, z)1UmN˜(dz, dt) ,
if the limit exists in L2(P). Here Um,m = 1, 2, · · · , is an increasing sequence of compact sets
Um ⊆ R\{0} with ν(Um) <∞ such that limm→∞ Um = R\{0}.
As in the Gaussian case we shall indicate by DN˜t,z = Dt,z the Malliavin derivative in the
direction of N˜ and by DN˜1,2 the corresponding Sobolev stochastic space, see [8].
Definition 2.6 Let MN˜ denote the set of stochastic functions φ : [0, T ] × R × Ω → R such
that:
1. φ(t, z, ω) = φ1(t, ω)φ2(t, z, ω) where φ1(ω, t) ∈ DN˜1,2 is ca`dla`g and φ2(ω, t, z) is adapted
such that
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
φ2(t, z)ν(dz)dt
]
<∞ ,
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2. Dt+,zφ := lims→t+Ds,zφ exists in L2(P× λ× ν),
3. φ(t, z) +Dt+,zφ(t, z) is Skorohod integrable.
We let MN˜1,2 be the closure of the linear span of MB with respect to the norm given by
‖φ‖MN˜1,2 := ‖φ‖L2(P×λ×ν) + ‖Dt+,zφ(t, z)‖L2(P×λ×ν)
Then we have the following relation between the forward and the Skorohod integrals (see
[6, 8]):
Lemma 2.7 If φ ∈MN˜1,2 then it is forward integrable and∫ T
0
∫
R
φ(t, z)N˜(dz, d−t) =
∫ T
0
∫
R
Dt+,zφ(t, z)ν(dz)dt+
∫ T
0
∫
R
(φ(t, z)+Dt+,zφ(t, z))N˜(dz, δt) .
(2.6)
Moreover
E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
φ(t, z)N˜(dz, d−t)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
Dt+,zφ(t, z)ν(dz)dt
]
. (2.7)
Then by (2.6) and duality formula for Skorohod integral for Poisson process see [8], we have
Corollary 2.8 Suppose φ ∈MN˜1,2 and F ∈ DN˜1,2, then
E
[
F
∫ T
0
∫
R
φ(t, z)N˜(dz, d−t)
]
= E
[
F
∫ T
0
∫
R
Dt+,zφ(t, z)ν(dz)dt
]
+E
[
F
∫ T
0
∫
R
(φ(t, z) + Dt+,zφ(t, z))N˜(dz, δt)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
φ(t, z)Dt,zFν(dz)dt
]
+E
[∫ T
0
∫
R
(F + Dt,zF )Dt+,zφ(t, z)ν(dz)dt
]
. (2.8)
3 A stochastic maximum principle for insider stochastic dif-
ferential games
We now return to Problem 1.1 given in the introduction. We make the following assumptions:
1. The functions b : [0, T ]× R× U × Ω→ R, σ : [0, T ]× R× U × Ω→ R, γ : [0, T ]× R×
U ×K × R0 × Ω → R, f : [0, T ] × R × U × Ω → R and g : R × Ω → R are contained
in C1 with respect to the arguments x ∈ R, u0 ∈ U and u1 ∈ K for each t ∈ [0, T ] and
a.a. ω ∈ Ω.
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2. For all s, r, t ∈ (0, T ), t ≤ r and all bounded G2t -measurable (respectively G1t -measurable)
random variables α = α(ω) (respectively ξ = ξ(ω)), ω ∈ Ω, the controls βα(s) :=(
0, βiα(s)
)
and ηξ(s) :=
(
0, ηiξ(s)
)
for i = 1, 2 with
βiα(s) := α
i(ω)χ[t,r](s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T, (3.1)
respectively
ηiξ(s) := ξ
i(ω)χ[t,r](s), 0 ≤ s ≤ T (3.2)
belong to AΠ (respectively AΘ). Also, we will denote the transposes of the vectors β
and η by β∗, η∗ respectively.
3. For all pi, β ∈ AΠ with β bounded, there exists a δ1 > 0 such that
pi + yβ ∈ AΠ , for all y ∈ (−δ1, δ1) (3.3)
and such that the family{
∂
∂x
f1(t,X(pi+yβ,θ)(t), pi + yβ, θ, z)
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(t)
+∇pif1(t,X(pi+yβ,θ)(t), pi + yβ, θ, z)β∗(t)
}
y∈(−δ1,δ1)
is λ× ν × P−uniformly integrable and{
g′(X(pi+yβ,θ)(T ))
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(T )
}
y∈(−δ1,δ1)
is P−uniformly integrable. Similarly, for all θ, η ∈ AΘ with η bounded, there exists a
δ2 > 0 such that
θ + vη ∈ AΘ , for all v ∈ (−δ2, δ2) (3.4)
and such that the family{
∂
∂x
f2(t,X(pi,θ+vη)(t), pi, θ + vη, z)
d
dy
X(pi,θ+vη)(t)
+∇θf2(t,X(pi,θ+vη)(t), pi, θ + vη, z)η∗(t)
}
v∈(−δ2,δ2)
is λ× ν × P−uniformly integrable and{
g′(X(pi,θ+vη)(T ))
d
dy
X(pi,θ+vη)(T )
}
v∈(−δ2,δ2)
is P−uniformly integrable.
4. For all pi, β ∈ AΠ and θ, η ∈ AΘ with β, η bounded the processes
Y (t) = Yβ(t) =
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(t)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
, V (t) = Vη(t) =
d
dv
X(pi,θ+vη)(t)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
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exist and follow the SDE, respectively:
dY piβ (t) =Yβ(t
−)
[
∂
∂x
b(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) dt +
∂
∂x
σ(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) d−B(t)
+
∫
R0
∂
∂x
γ
(
t,X(t−), pi0(t), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z
)
N˜(dz, d−t)
]
+ β∗(t)
[∇pib(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) dt + ∇piσ(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) d−B(t)
+
∫
R0
∇piγ
(
t,X(t−), pi0(t), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z
)
N˜(dz, d−t)
]
(3.5)
Y (0) = 0
and
dV θη (t) =Vη(t
−)
[
∂
∂x
b(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) dt +
∂
∂x
σ(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) d−B(t)
+
∫
R0
∂
∂x
γ
(
t,X(t−), pi0(t), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z
)
N˜(dz, d−t)
]
+ η∗(t)
[∇θb(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) dt + ∇θσ(t,X(t), pi0(t), θ0(t)) d−B(t)
+
∫
R0
∇θγ
(
t,X(t−), pi0(t), pi1(t−, z), θ0(t−), θ1(t−, z), z
)
N˜(dz, d−t)
]
(3.6)
V (0) = 0
5. Suppose that for all pi ∈ AΠ and θ ∈ AΘ the following processes
Ki(t) := g′i(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂
∂x
fi(s,X(s), pi, θ, z1)µ(dz1)ds (3.7)
DtKi(t) :=Dtg′i(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
Dt
∂
∂x
fi(s,X(s), pi, θ, z1)µ(dz1)ds
Dt,zKi(t) :=Dt,zg′i(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt,z
∂
∂x
fi(s,X(s), pi, θ, z1)µ(dz1)ds
H0i (s, x, pi, θ) :=Ki(s)
(
b(s, x, pi0, θ0) +Ds+σ(s, x, pi0, θ0)
+
∫
R0
Ds+,zγ(s, x, pi, θ, z) ν(dz)
)
+DsK(s)σ(s, x, pi0, θ0)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK(s)
{
γ(s, x, pi, θ, z) +Ds+,zγ(s, x, pi, θ, z)
}
ν(dz) (3.8)
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G(t, s) := exp
[∫ s
t
{
∂b
∂x
(r,X(r), pi0(r), θ0(r))− 12
(
∂σ
∂x
)2
(r,X(r), pi0(r), θ0(r))
}
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(r,X(r), pi0(r), θ0(r)) d−B(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r,X(r), pi, θ, z)
)
− ∂γ
∂x
(r,X(r), pi, θ, z)
}
ν(dz) dt
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(
r,X(r−), pi(r−, z), θ(r−, z), z
))}
N˜(dz, d−r)
]
(3.9)
pi(t) :=Ki(t) +
∫ T
t
∂
∂x
H0i (s,X(s), pi0(s), pi1(s, z), θ0(s), θ1(s, z))G(t, s) ds (3.10)
qi(t) :=Dtpi(t), (3.11)
ri(t, z) :=Dt,zpi(t) (3.12)
all exist for i = 1, 2, 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T, z1, z ∈ R0.
Now let introduce the general Hamiltonians of insiders.
Definition 3.1 The general stochastic Hamiltonians for the stochastic differential game for
insiders in Problem 1.1 are the functions
Hi (t, x, pi, θ, ω) : [0, T ]× R× U ×K × Ω −→ R, i = 1, 2
defined by
Hi (t, x, pi, θ, ω) :=
∫
R0
fi(t, x, pi, θ, z, ω)µ(dz) + pi(t)
(
b(t, x, pi0, θ0, ω) +Dt+σ(t, x, pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
Dt+,zγ(t, x, pi, θ, z, ω) ν(dz)
)
+ qi(t)σ(t, x, pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
ri(t, z)
{
γ(t, x, pi, θ, z, ω) +Dt+,zγ(t, x, pi, θ, z, ω)
}
ν(dz), (3.13)
where pi = (pi0, pi1) and θ = (θ0, θ1)
We can now state a general stochastic maximum principle of insider for zero-sum games:
Theorem 3.2 [Maximum principle for insider non zero-sum games]
(i) Suppose (pi, θ̂) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ is a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
1. J1(pi, θ̂) ≤ J1(pi, θ̂) for all pi ∈ AΠ
2. J2(pi, θ) ≤ J2(pi, θ̂) for all θ ∈ AΘ
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Then
E
[
∇piĤ1(t,Xpi,θ̂(t), pi, θ̂, ω)
∣∣∣
pi=pi
∣∣∣G2t ] + E[A] = 0 a.e. in (t, ω), (3.14)
and
E
[
∇θĤ2(t,Xpi,θ(t), pi, θ, ω)
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
∣∣∣G1t ] + E[B] = 0 a.e. in (t, ω), (3.15)
where A is given by (6.21) and B is defined in a similar way.
X̂(t) =X(pi,θ̂)(t),
Ĥi
(
t, X̂(t), pi, θ, ω
)
:=
∫
R0
fi(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω)µ(dz) (3.16)
+ p̂i(t)
(
b(t, X̂(t), pi0, θ0, ω) +Dt+σ(t, X̂(t), pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
Dt+,zγ(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω) ν(dz)
)
+ q̂i(t)σ(t, X̂(t), pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
r̂i(t, z)
{
γ(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω) +Dt+,zγ(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω)
}
ν(dz),
with
p̂i(t) := K̂i(t) +
∫ T
t
∂
∂x
Ĥ0i (s, X̂(s), pi(s), θ̂(s))Ĝ(t, s) ds (3.17)
K̂i(t) := g′i(X̂(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂
∂x
fi(s, X̂(s), pi(s, z), θ̂(s, z), z)µ(dz)ds (3.18)
Ĥ0i (s, X̂, pi, θ̂) := K̂i(s)
(
b(s, X̂, pi0, θ̂0) +Ds+σ(s, X̂, pi0, θ̂0)
+
∫
R0
Ds+,zγ(s, X̂, pi, θ̂, z) ν(dz)
)
+DsKi(s)σ(s, X̂, pi0, θ̂0)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zKi(s)
{
γ(s, X̂, pi, θ̂, z) +Ds+,zγ(s, X̂, pi, θ̂, z)
}
ν(dz)
(3.19)
Ĝ(t, s) := exp
[∫ s
t
{
∂b
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi0(r), θ̂0(r)
)
− 1
2
(
∂σ
∂x
)2 (
r, X̂(r), pi0(r), θ̂0(r)
)}
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi0(r), θ̂0(r)
)
d−B(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi, θ̂, z
))
− ∂γ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi, θ̂, z
)}
ν(dz) dt
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r−), pi(r−, z), θ̂(r−, z), z
))}
N˜(dz, d−r)
]
(3.20)
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(ii) Conversely, suppose (pi, θ̂) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ such (3.14) and (3.15) hold. Then
∂J1
∂y
(pi + yβ, θ̂)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
= 0 for all β, (3.21)
∂J2
∂v
(pi, θ̂ + vη)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= 0 for all η, (3.22)
In particular, if
pi → J1(pi, θ̂)
and
θ → J2(pi, θ),
are concave, then
(
pi, θ̂
)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.1 Zero-sum games
Here, we suppose that the given performance functional for Player I is the negative of that
for Player II, i.e.,
J1(u0, u1) := E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), ω)µ(dz)dt + g(X(T ), ω)
]
= −J2(u0, u1)
(3.23)
where E = ExP denotes the expectation with respect to P given that X(0) = x. Suppose
that the controls u0(t) and u1(t, z) have the form (1.4) and (1.5). Let AΠ (respectively AΘ)
denote the given family of controls pi = (pi0, pi1) (respectively θ = (θ0, θ1)) such that they are
contained in the set of G1t -adapted controls (respectively G2t -adapted controls), (1.1) has a
unique strong solution up to time T and
E
[∫ T
0
|f(t,X(t), u0(t), u1(t, z), ω)| µ(dz)dt + |g(X(T ), ω)|
]
<∞. (3.24)
Then the insider information zero-sum stochastic differential game problem is the following:
Problem 3.3 Find pi∗ ∈ AG2Π and θ∗ ∈ AG
1
Θ and Φ ∈ R (if it exists) such that
Φ = inf
θ∈AG1Θ
( sup
pi∈AG2Π
J(pi, θ)) = J(pi∗, θ∗) = sup
pi∈AG2Π
( inf
θ∈AG1Θ
J(pi, θ)) (3.25)
Such a control (pi∗, θ∗) is called an optimal control (if it exists). The intuitive idea is that
while Player I controls pi, Player II controls θ. The actions of the players are antagonistic,
which means that between player I and II there is a payoff J(pi, θ) and it is a reward for Player
I and cost for Player II. Note that since we allow b, σ, γ, f and g to be stochastic processes
and also because our controls are G1t -adapted, and G2t -adapted respectively, this problem is
not of Markovian type and can not be solved by dynamic programming.
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Theorem 3.4 [Maximum principle for insider zero-sum games]
(i) Suppose (pi, θ̂) ∈ AΠ ×AΘ is a directional critical point for J(pi, θ), in the sense that for
all bounded β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists δ > 0 such that pi+yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂+vη ∈ AΘ
for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ) and
c(y, v) := J(pi + yβ, θ̂ + vη), y, v ∈ (−δ, δ)
has a critical point at zero, i.e.,
∂c
∂y
(0, 0) =
∂c
∂v
(0, 0) = 0. (3.26)
Then
E
[
∇piĤ(t,Xpi,θ̂(t), pi, θ̂, ω)
∣∣∣
pi=pi
∣∣∣G2t ] + E[A] = 0 a.e. in (t, ω), (3.27)
and
E
[
∇θĤ(t,Xpi,θ(t), pi, θ, ω)
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
∣∣∣G1t ] + E[B] = 0 a.e. in (t, ω), (3.28)
where A and B are given as in the previous theorem.
X̂(t) =X(pi,θ̂)(t),
Ĥ
(
t, X̂(t), pi, θ, ω
)
:=
∫
R0
f(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω)µ(dz) (3.29)
+ p̂(t)
(
b(t, X̂(t), pi0, θ0, ω) +Dt+σ(t, X̂(t), pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
Dt+,zγ(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω) ν(dz)
)
+ q̂(t)σ(t, X̂(t), pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
r̂(t, z)
{
γ(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω) +Dt+,zγ(t, X̂(t), pi, θ, z, ω)
}
ν(dz),
with
p̂(t) := K̂(t) +
∫ T
t
∂
∂x
Ĥ0(s, X̂(s), pi(s), θ̂(s))Ĝ(t, s) ds (3.30)
K̂(t) := g′(X̂(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂
∂x
f(s, X̂(s), pi(s, z), θ̂(s, z), z)µ(dz)ds (3.31)
Ĥ0(s, X̂, pi, θ̂) := K̂(s)
(
b(s, X̂, pi0, θ̂0) +Ds+σ(s, X̂, pi0, θ̂0)
+
∫
R0
Ds+,zγ(s, X̂, pi, θ̂, z) ν(dz)
)
+DsK(s)σ(s, X̂, pi0, θ̂0)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK(s)
{
γ(s, X̂, pi, θ̂, z) +Ds+,zγ(s, X̂, pi, θ̂, z)
}
ν(dz)
(3.32)
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Ĝ(t, s) := exp
[∫ s
t
{
∂b
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi0(r), θ̂0(r)
)
− 1
2
(
∂σ
∂x
)2 (
r, X̂(r), pi0(r), θ̂0(r)
)}
dr
+
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi0(r), θ̂0(r)
)
dB−(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi, θ̂, z
))
− ∂γ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r), pi, θ̂, z
)}
ν(dz) dt
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(
r, X̂(r−), pi(r−, z), θ̂(r−, z), z
))}
N˜(dz, d−r)
]
(3.33)
(ii) Conversely, suppose that there exists a (pi, θ̂) ∈ AΠ × AΘ such that (3.27) and (3.28)
hold. Then (pi, θ̂) satisfies 3.26.
4 Controlled Itoˆ-Le´vy processes
The main result of the previous section (Theorem 3.2) is difficult to apply because of the
appearance of the terms Y (t), Dt+Y (t) and Dt+,zY (t), which all depend on the control u.
However, consider the special case when the coefficients do not depend on X, i.e., when
b(t, x, u, ω) = b(t, u, ω), σ(t, x, u, ω) = σ(t, u, ω)
and θ(t, x, u, z, ω) = θ(t, u, z, ω). (4.1)
Then equation (1.1) takes the form
d−X(t) = b(t, u(t), ω)dt + σ(t, u(t), ω)d−B(t)
+
∫
R0 θ(t, u(t), z, ω)N˜(dz, d
−t);
X(0) = x ∈ R
(4.2)
We call such processes controlled Itoˆ-Le´vy processes.
In this case, Theorem 3.2 simplifies to the following
Theorem 4.1 Let X(t) be a controlled Itoˆ-Le´vy process as given in Equation (4.2). Assume
that the conditions 1-5 as in Theorem 3.2 are in force.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) (pi, θ̂) is a directional critical point for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded
β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists δ > 0 such that pi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂ + vη ∈ AΘ for all
y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
(ii)
E
[
Lpi(t)α + Mpi(t)Dt+α +
∫
R0
Rpi(t, z)Dt+,zαν(dz)
]
= 0
and
E
[
Lθ(t)ξ + Mθ(t)Dt+ξ +
∫
R0
Rθ(t, z)Dt+,zξ ν(dz)
]
= 0
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for all α and ξ Malliavin differentiable and all t ∈ [0, T ], where
Lpi(t) = K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(t) + Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇pif1(t) + DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz), (4.3)
Mpi(t) = K̂1(t)∇piσ(t), (4.4)
Rpi(t, z) =
{
K̂1(t) +Dt,zK̂1(t)
}(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
, (4.5)
Lθ(t) = K̂2(t)
(
∇θb(t) + Dt+∇θσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇θγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇θf2(t) + DtK̂2(t)∇θσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂2(t)
(
∇θγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇θγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz), (4.6)
Mθ(t) = K̂2(t)∇θσ(t) (4.7)
and
Rθ(t, z) =
{
K̂2(t) +Dt,zK̂2(t)
}(
∇θγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇θγ(t, z)
)
. (4.8)
In particular, if
pi → J1(pi, θ̂)
and
θ → J2(pi, θ),
are concave, then
(
pi, θ̂
)
is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It is easy to see that in this case, p(t) = K(t), q(t) = DtK(t), r(t, z) = Dt,zK(t)
and the general Hamiltonian Hi, i = 1, 2 given by (3.13) is reduced to Hi given as follows
Hi (t, x, pi, θ, ω) :=
∫
R0
fi(t, pi, θ, z, ω)µ(dz) + pi(t)
(
b(t, pi0, θ0, ω) +Dt+σ(t, pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
Dt+,zγ(t, pi, θ, z, ω) ν(dz)
)
+ qi(t)σ(t, pi0, θ0, ω)
+
∫
R0
ri(t, z)
{
γ(t, pi, θ, z, ω) +Dt+,zγ(t, pi, θ, z, ω)
}
ν(dz),
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(i) Performing the same calculation leads to
A1 =A3 = A5 = 0,
A2 =E
[∫ t+h
t
{
K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(s) +Ds+∇piσ(s) +
∫
R0
Dts,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
∇pif1(s, z)µ(dz)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(s, z) +Ds,z∇piγ(s, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
αds
]
,
A4 =E
[∫ t+h
t
K̂1(t)∇piσ(s)Ds+αds
]
,
A6 =E
[∫ t+h
t
∫
R0
(
K̂1(t) +Ds,zK̂1(t)
){
∇piγ(s, z) + Ds+,z∇piγ(s, z)
}
ν(dz)Ds+,zαds
]
,
It follows that
d
dh
A2
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=E
[{
K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(t) + Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇pif1(t) + DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
α
]
,
d
dh
A4
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=E
[
K̂1(t)∇piσ(t)Dt+α
]
,
d
dh
A6
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=E
[∫
R0
{
K̂1(t) +Dt,zK̂1(t)
}(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)Dt+,zα
]
.
This means that
0 =E
[{
K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(t) + Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇pif1(t) + DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
α
+ K̂1(t)∇piσ(t)Dt+α
+
∫
R0
{
K̂1(t) +Dt,zK̂1(t)
}(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)Dt+,zα
]
.
Performing the same computation for H2, the result follows. This completes the proof
for (i).
(ii) The converse part follows from the arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
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4.1 Zero-sum Game
Under the same hypothesis as given in Section 3.1, if we assume that the controlled process
is of Itoˆ-Le´vy type, Theorem 3.4 becomes
Theorem 4.2 Let X(t) be a controlled Itoˆ-Le´vy process as given in Equation (4.2). Retain
the conditions 1-5 as in Theorem 3.2.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) (pi, θ̂) is a directional critical point for J(pi, θ) in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ AΠ
and η ∈ AΘ, there exists δ > 0 such that pi+yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂+vη ∈ AΘ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ)
and
c(y, v) := J(pi + yβ, θ̂ + vη), y, v ∈ (−δ, δ)
has a critical point at 0, i.e.,
∂c
∂y
(0, 0) =
∂c
∂v
(0, 0) = 0. (4.9)
(ii)
E
[
Lpi(t)α + Mpi(t)Dt+α +
∫
R0
Rpi(t, z)Dt+,zαν(dz)
]
= 0
and
E
[
Lθ(t)ξ + Mθ(t)Dt+ξ +
∫
R0
Rθ(t, z)Dt+,zξ ν(dz)
]
= 0
for all α and ξ Malliavin differentiable and all t ∈ [0, T ], where
Lpi(t) = K̂(t)
(
∇pib(t) + Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇pif(t) + DtK̂(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂(t)
(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz), (4.10)
Mpi(t) = K̂(t)∇piσ(t), (4.11)
Rpi(t, z) =
{
K̂(t) +Dt,zK̂(t)
}(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
, (4.12)
Lθ(t) = K̂(t)
(
∇θb(t) + Dt+∇θσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇θγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇θf(t) + DtK̂(t)∇θσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂(t)
(
∇θγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇θγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz), (4.13)
Mθ(t) = K̂(t)∇θσ(t) (4.14)
and
Rθ(t, z) =
{
K̂(t) +Dt,zK̂(t)
}(
∇θγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇θγ(t, z)
)
. (4.15)
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4.2 Some special cases revisited
The results obtained so far are for given general sup-filtrations. To provide some concrete ex-
amples let us confine ourselves to particular cases of filtrations which are first chaos generated
(see [19]). This can arise when
• the insider always has information in advance compared to the honest trader. This
means that if Gt and Ft represent the information flow of the insider and the honest
respectively, then we have Gt ⊃ Ft+δ(t) where δ(t) > 0;
• the trader has from the very beginning a particular information about the future (initial
enlargement of filtration). This means that if Gt and Ft represent the information flow
of the insider and the honest, then Gt = Ft∨σ(L1)∨· · ·∨σ(Ln) where Li, i = 1, · · · , n
are e.g. Brownian integrals of deterministic functions.
Let B be one of the following sup-filtrations,
B1 =Ft+δ(t),
B2 =Ft ∨ σ(BT ),
B3 =F[0,t]∪O,
where O is an open set contained in [0, T ]. Then it can be shown (see [19]) that Bi, i =
1, · · · , 3 are the first chaos generated σ-algebras.
From now on we assume that the following conditions are fulfilled:
Fix a t0 ∈ [0, T ]. Then
(C1) There exist a Ai = Ait0 ⊆ D1,2 ∩ L2(Git0), i = 1, 2 and a measurable Mi ⊂ [t0, T ], i =
1, 2 such that Dtα and Dt,zα are Git0-measurable, for all α ∈ Ai, t ∈Mi, i = 1, 2,
(C2) Dt+α = Dtα and Dt+,zα = Dt,zα for all α ∈ Ai and a.a. t, z, t ∈Mi, i = 1, 2.
(C3) Ai is total in L2(Git0), i = 1, 2,
(C4) E[Mθ(t)|G1t0 ]·χ[0,t]∩M1 , E[Rθ(t, z)|G1t0 ]·χ[0,t]∩M1 , E[Mpi(t)|G2t0 ]·χ[0,t]∩M2 and E[Rpi(t, z))|G2t0 ]·
χ[0,t]∩M2 are Skorohod integrable for all t,
(C5)
∫ T
0 {|E[Lθ(t)|G1t0 ]|+ |E[Lpi(t)|G1t0 ]|}dt <∞ a.e.,
where Lpi, Mpi, Lθ, Mθ, Rpi and Rθ are defined as in (4.3), (4.4), (4.6), (4.7), (4.5) and (4.8).
Remark 4.3 In [10], a filtration satisfying (C1)–(C3) is called smoothly anticipative fil-
tration.
Theorem 4.4 Suppose that Gi, i = 1, 2 satisfied (C1)–(C5). Suppose that (pi, θ̂) is a di-
rectional critical point for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ AΠ and
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η ∈ AΘ, there exists a δ > 0 such that pi+ yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂+ vη ∈ AΘ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). Then
for all hi = χ[t0,s)(t)χMi(t), i = 1, 2
0 =E
[∫ T
0
E [Lθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)dt+ ∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)δBt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
E
[
Rθi(t, z)|Hi
]
hi(t) N˜(δt, dz)
∣∣∣∣Hi] . (4.16)
where Hi = Git0 , i = 1, 2, θ1 = θ, θ2 = pi.
Proof. See Theorem 5.7 in [10].
Corollary 4.5 Assume that the conditions in Theorem 4.4 are in force. In addition, we
require that E
[
Mθi(t)|Hi
] ∈MB1,2, i = 1, 2. Set Xi(t) = E [B(t)|Hi]. Then
0 =
∫ T
0
E [Lθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)dt+ ∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)d−Xi(t)
−
∫ T
0
Dt+E
[
Mθi(t)|Hi
]
hi(t)dt, (4.17)
where θi, hi, and Hi are as in Theorem 4.4.
Proof. Note that Xi(t), i = 1, 2 has continuous version and has existing quadratic variation
(since B(t) has quadratic variation). By Lemma 2.3 and by assumption, we know that∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)δBt = ∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)d−B(t)− ∫ T
0
Dt+E
[
Mθi(t)|Hi
]
hi(t)dt
(4.18)
It follows from condition (C1) that
E [
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)δBt ∣∣Hi] =E [ ∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)d−B(t) ∣∣Hi]
−
∫ T
0
DtE
[
Mθi(t)|Hi
]
hi(t)dt.
On the other hand, using uniform convergence on compacts (ucp) in L1(P ), we observe that
E [
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)d−B(t) ∣∣Hi] =E [ lim
→0+
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)B(t+ )−B(t)

dt
∣∣Hi]
= lim
→0+
E [
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)B(t+ )−B(t)

dt
∣∣Hi]
= lim
→0+
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)E [ B(t+ )−B(t)

∣∣Hi] dt
= lim
→0+
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)Xi(t+ )−Xi(t)

dt
=
∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)d−Xi(t) ( in the ucp sense)
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From the previous arguments, we can deduce the following results
Theorem 4.6 [Brownian case] Assume that the conditions in Corollary 4.5 are satisfied.
Suppose that b and σ do not depend on the controlled process X(·). Set Xit := E
[
B(t)| Git0
]
, i =
1, 2. Let the quadratic variation
[
Xi
]
of Xi, i = 1, 2 be non-zero. The the following statement
are equivalent
(i) (pi, θ̂) is a directional critical point for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded
β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists a δ > 0 such that pi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂ + vη ∈ AΘ for all
y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
(ii)
(1)E
[
Lpi(t)| G2t0
]
= E
[
Mpi(t)| G2t0
]
= 0, dt− a.e on (supp d [X2]) ∩ (t0, T ], P − a.e
(2)E
[
Lθ(t)| G1t0
]
= E
[
Mθ(t)| G1t0
]
= 0, dt− a.e on (supp d [X1]) ∩ (t0, T ], P − a.e
where Lpi, Mpi, Lθ, and Mθ are given by (4.3), (4.4), (4.6) and (4.7), respectively and
where supp d
[
Xi
]
denotes the support of the measure induced by the quadratic variation
of the process Xi, i = 1, 2. In particular, if
pi → J1(pi, θ̂)
and
θ → J2(pi, θ),
are concave, then
(
pi, θ̂
)
is a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. Note that[∫ ·
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t)d−Xi(t)]
T
=
∫ T
0
(
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t))2 d [Xi]t .
We conclude from (4.17) that∫ T
0
(
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Hi]hi(t))2 d [Xi]t = 0 P − a.e.
The proof follows.
Remark 4.7 If
[
Xi
]
, i = 1, 2 are non-zero, then
(
B(t),Git
)
, i = 1, 2 cannot belong to the
class of Dirichlet processes. Examples which satisfy (C1)–(C3) (for M∈ (t0, T ]) are B1 or
B3. See also Theorem 4.8.
Theorem 4.8 [Mixed case] Suppose that b, σ and θ do not depend on X(·) and that
Gi = B1 or Gi = B3, i = 1, 2.
In addition assume that (C4)–(C5) are valid forM∈ (t0, T ]. Then the following statements
are equivalent:
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(i) (pi, θ̂) is a directional critical point for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded
β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists a δ > 0 such that pi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂ + vη ∈ AΘ for all
y, v ∈ (−δ, δ).
(ii)
(iii)E
[
Lpi(t)| G2t0
]
= E
[
Mpi(t)| G2t0
]
= E
[
Rpi(t, z)| G2t0
]
= 0,
(iv)E
[
Lθ(t)| G1t0
]
= E
[
Mθ(t)| G1t0
]
= E
[
Rθ(t, z)| G1t0
]
= 0,
where Lpi, Mpi, Rpi, Lθ, Mθ and Rθ are given by (4.3), (4.4), (4.5), (4.6), (4.7) and
(4.8) respectively. In particular, if
pi → J1(pi, θ̂)
and
θ → J2(pi, θ),
are concave, then
(
pi, θ̂
)
is a Nash-equilibrium.
In order to study the case of the initial enlargement of filtration, we need the following
Theorem which is based on Theorem 5.8 in [10]:
Theorem 4.9 [Brownian case] Adopting the notation of Section 5.1 in [10], suppose that
Gi, i = 1, 2 satisfied (C1)–(C3) and γ = 0. Suppose that (pi, θ̂) is a directional critical point
for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists a
δ > 0 such that pi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂ + vη ∈ AΘ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). In addition, we required
that E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Git−] ∈MB1,2 and are forward integrable with respect to E [d−B(t) ∣∣Git−]. Then
0 =
∫ T
0
E [Lθi(t)
∣∣Git−]h0(t)dt+ ∫ T
0
E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Git−]h0(t)E [d−B(t) ∣∣Git−]
−
∫ T
0
Dt+E [Mθi(t)
∣∣Git−]h0(t)dt (4.19)
for all bounded deterministic functions h0(t), where θ1 = θ, θ2 = pi.
Proof. See Theorem 5.8 in [10].
It follows from the preceding Theorem and Theorem 5.11 in [10] that
Theorem 4.10 [Brownian case] Suppose that Gi = Ft ∨ σ(B(T )), i = 1, 2. Suppose the
conditions of Theorem 4.9 are satisfied. Assume that (pi, θ̂) is a directional critical point for
Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists a δ > 0
such that pi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂ + vη ∈ AΘ for all y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). Then
E [Lθi(t)
∣∣Git−]+ E [Mθi(t) ∣∣Git−] B(T )−B(t)T − t = 0, for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.20)
where θ1 = θ, θ2 = pi.
In the next section, we apply our results to model a competition of two heterogeneously
informed agents in the market. We particularly focus on a game between the market and the
trader. We assume that the mean relative growth rate θ(t) of the risky asset is not known to
the trader, but subject to uncertainty.
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5 Application to optimal and competing-insider trading
Consider a financial market with two investments possibilities:
1. A risk free asset, where the unit price S0(t) at time t is given by
dS0(t) =r(t)S0(t) dt, S0(0) = 1. (5.1)
2. A risky asset, where the unit price S1(t) at time t is given by the stochastic differential
equation
dS1(t) =S1(t−)
[
θ(t)dt+ σ0(t)d−B(t) +
∫
R0
γ(t, z)N˜(d−t, dz)
]
, S1(0) > 0. (5.2)
Here r(t) ≥ 0, θ(t), σ0(t), and γ(t, z) ≥ −1 +  (for some constant  > 0) are given G1t -
predictable, forward integrable processes, where
{G1t }t∈[0,T ] is a given filtration such that
Ft ⊂ G1t for all t ∈ [0, T ] (5.3)
Suppose a trader in this market is an insider, in the sense that she has access to information
represented by G2t at time t (with Ft ⊂ G2t for all t ∈ [0, T ]). Assume that G1t ⊂ G2t (e.g.
G1t = Ft). Let pi(t) = pi(t, ω) be a portfolio representing the amount invested by her in the
risky asset at time t. Then this portfolio is a G2t -predictable stochastic process and hence the
corresponding wealth process X(t) = X(pi,θ)(t) will then satisfy the (forward) SDE
d−X(t) =
X(t)− pi(t)
S0(t)
dS0(t) +
pi(t)
S1(t)
d−S1(t)
=X(t)r(t)dt+ pi(t)
[
(θ(t)− r(t)) dt+ σ0(t)d−B(t)
+
∫
R0
γ(t, z)N˜(d−t, dz)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ] , (5.4)
X(0) =x > 0. (5.5)
By choosing S0(t) as a numeraire, we can, without loss of generality, assume that
r(t) = 0 (5.6)
from now on. Then Equations (5.4) and (5.5) simplify to d−X(t) = pi(t)
[
θ(t)dt+ σ0(t)d−B(t) +
∫
R0
γ(t, z)N˜(d−t, dz)
]
,
X(0) = x > 0.
(5.7)
This is a controlled Itoˆ-Le´vy process of the type discussed in Section 4. Let us assume that
the mean relative growth rate θ(t) of the risky asset is not known to the trader, but subject
to uncertainty. We may regard θ as a market scenario or a stochastic control of the market,
which is playing against the trader. Let AG2Π and AG
1
Θ denote the set of admissible controls
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pi, θ, respectively. The worst case insider information scenario optimal problem for the trader
is to find pi∗ ∈ AG2Π and θ∗ ∈ AG
1
Θ and Φ ∈ R such that
Φ = inf
θ∈AG1Θ
( sup
pi∈AG2Π
E[U(Xθ,pi)(T )])
=E
[
U(Xθ
∗,pi∗)(T )
]
(5.8)
where U : R+ → R is a given utility function, assumed to be concave, strictly increasing and
C1. We want to study this problem by using results of Section 4. In this case, the processes
K(t),L(t), M(t) and R(t, z) which are given respectively by equations (3.7), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5),
(4.6), (4.7) and (4.8) become
K1(t) =K2(t) = U ′ (X(T )) , (5.9)
Lpi(t) =U ′ (X(T ))
[
θ(t) +Dt+σ0(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,zγ(t, z) ν(dz)
]
(5.10)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zU
′ (X(T )) [γ(t, z) +Dt+,zγ(t, z)] ν(dz) +DtU ′ (X(T ))σ0(t),
Mpi(t) =U ′ (X(T ))σ0(t), (5.11)
Rpi(t, z) =
{
U ′ (X(T )) +Dt,zU ′ (X(T ))
} {γ(t, z) +Dt+,zγ(t, z)} . (5.12)
Lθ(t) =U ′ (X(T ))pi (5.13)
Mθ(t) =Rθ(t, z) = 0 (5.14)
Therefore Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 4.8 of Section 4 imply the following:
Theorem 5.1 Suppose that σ0(t) 6= 0 and that either
Gi = B1 or B3, i = 1, 2. (Mixed case)
or the quadratic variation of Xi(t) = E
[
B(t)| Git0
]
is non-zero, i = 1, 2, (Brownian case).
Then there does not exist an optimal solution (pi∗, θ∗) ∈ AG2Π ×AG
1
Θ of the stochastic differential
game (5.8).
Proof. Suppose an optimal portfolio exists. Without loss of generality we only consider the
first case. Then we have seen that
E
[
Lpi(t)| G2t0
]
= E
[
Mpi(t)| G2t0
]
= E
[
Rpi(t, z)| G2t
]
= E
[
Lθ(t)| G1t0
]
= 0
for a.a. t ∈ (t0, T ] , z ∈ R0. In particular,
E
[
Mpi(t)| G2t0
]
= E
[
U ′ (X(T ))
∣∣G2t0]σ0(t) = 0,
or
E
[
Lθ(t)| G1t0
]
= E
[
U ′ (X(T ))
∣∣G1t0]pi(t) = 0.
Choosing t = T and let t0 ↑ T , we get U ′ (X(T )) = 0, which contradicts our assumption
about U . Hence an optimal portfolio cannot exist.
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Remark 5.2 The previous result is in accordance with Theorem 1 in [11], since the Brownian
motion is not a semimartingale neither in the filtration B1 nor in the filtration B3.
Theorem 5.3 (Knowing the terminal value of the risky asset) Suppose that σ0(t) 6= 0 G1t =
Ft and G2t = Ft∨σ(S1(T )), t ∈ [0, T ] and the coefficients θ(t), σ0(t) = σ0 6= 0 and γ(t, z) ≡ 0
are deterministic. Further, require that the conditions (C4)–(C5) hold for M ∈ (t0, T ] and
that
1. E
[
Mθ(t)| G1t0
]
, E
[
Mpi(t)| G2t0
] ∈MB1,2
2. lim
t↑T
E
[∣∣Dt+E [Mφi(t)| G2t0]∣∣] <∞ for φ1 = θ and φ2 = pi.
3. lim
t↑T
E [|Lφi(t)|] <∞ for φ1 = θ and φ2 = pi.
Then, there does not exist an optimal portfolio for the insider.
Proof. Since S1(t) can be written as
S1(t) = S1(0) exp
(∫ T
0
{
θ(t)− 1
2
σ20(t)
}
dt+
∫ T
0
σ0(t) dB(t)
)
, (5.15)
One finds that G2t = B2t . Hence the result follows from Theorem 6.3 in [10].
Remark 5.4 It can be shown (see [10]) that Theorem 5.3 also applies e.g to cases, when the
terminal value S1(T ) is given by max
o≤t≤T
B(t) or η(T ), where η is a Le´vy process.
6 Application to optimal insider consumption
Suppose we have a cash flow X(t) = X(pi,θ)(t) given by dX(t) = (θ(t)− u(t)) dt+ σ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
γ(t, z)N˜(dt, dz),
X(0) = x ∈ R.
(6.1)
Here θ(t), σ(t) and θ(t, z) are given FT -measurable processes and pi(t) ≥ 0 is the consumption
rate, assumed to be adapted to a given insider filtration {Gt}t∈[0,T ] where
Ft ⊂ Gt for all t
Let f(t, pi, θ, ω); t ∈ [0, T ] , pi, θ ∈ R, ω ∈ Ω be a given FT -measurable utility process.
Assume that u→ f(t, pi, θ, ω) is strictly increasing, concave and C1 for a.a (t, ω).
Let g(x, ω); x ∈ R, ω ∈ Ω be a given FT -measurable random variable for each x. Assume
that u→ g(x, ω) is concave for a.a ω. Define the performance functional J by
J(pi, θ) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, pi(t), θ(t), ω) dt+ g
(
X(u)(T ), ω
)]
; u ∈ AG , u ≥ 0 (6.2)
Note that pi → J(pi, θ̂) and θ → J(pi, θ) are concave, so (pi, θ̂) is a Nash-equilibrium if and
only if (pi, θ̂) is a critical point of J(pi, θ).
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Theorem 6.1 [Optimal insider consumption stochastic differential game consumption I]
(pi, θ̂) is a Nash-equilibrium of insider consumption rate for the performance functional J in
Equation (6.2) if and only if
−E
[
∂
∂θ
f(t, pi(t), θ̂(t), ω)
∣∣∣∣Gt] = E [ ∂∂pif(t, pi(t), θ̂(t), ω)
∣∣∣∣Gt] = E [g′ (X(pi,θ̂)(T ), ω)∣∣∣Gt]
(6.3)
Proof. In this case we have
K1(t) =K2(t) = g
(
X(pi,θ)(T )
)
Lpi(t) = − g
(
X(pi,θ)(T )
)
+
∂
∂pi
f(t, pi(t), θ̂(t))
Lθ(t) = g
(
X(pi,θ)(T )
)
+
∂
∂θ
f(t, pi(t), θ̂(t))
Mpi(t) =Rpi(t, z) = Mθ = Rθ = 0
Therefore (pi, θ̂) is a critical point for J(pi, θ) if and only if
0 =E [Lpi(t)| Gt] = E [Lθ(t)| Gt]
=E
[
∂
∂pi
f(t, pi(t), θ̂(t))
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ E [−g′ (X(pi,θ̂(t))(T ))∣∣∣Gt]
=E
[
∂
∂θ
f(t, pi(t), θ̂(t))
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ E [g′ (X(pi,θ̂(t))(T ))∣∣∣Gt]
Since X(pi,θ̂)(T ) depends on (pi, θ̂), Equation (6.3) does not give the value of pi(t) (respectively
θ̂(t)) directly.
However, in some special cases pi and θ̂(t) can be found explicitly:
Corollary 6.2 (Optimal insider stochastic differential game consumption II)
Assume that
g(x, ω) = λ(ω)x (6.4)
for some FT -measurable random variable λ ≥ 0.
Then the Nash-equilibrium (pi(t), θ̂(t)) of the stochastic differential game (6.2) is given by
E
[
∂
∂pi
f(t, pi, θ̂, ω)
∣∣∣∣Gt]
pi=pi(t)
=E [λ| Gt] , (6.5)
E
[
∂
∂θ
f(t, pi, θ̂, ω)
∣∣∣∣Gt]
θ=θ̂(t)
= − E [λ| Gt] (6.6)
Thus we see that the Nash-equilibrium exists, for any given insider information filtration
{Gt}t≥0.
24
References
[1] An, T. T. K., Øksendal, B.: A maximum principle for stochastic differential games with
partial information. J. of Optim. Theory and Appl. 139, p. 463483 (2008).
[2] An, T. T. K., Øksendal, B., Okur, Y. Y.: A Malliavin calculus approach to general
stochastic differential games with partial information . Preprint (2008).
[3] Baghery, F., Øksendal, B.: A maximum principle for stochastic control with partial
information. Stochastic Analysis and Applications 25, p. 705-717 (2007).
[4] Bertoin, J.: Le´vy processes. Volume 121 of Cambridge Tracts in Mathematics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, (1996).
[5] Biagini, F., Øksendal, B.: A general stochastic calculus approach to insider trading.
Applied Mathematics and Optimization 52, p. 167-181 (2005).
[6] Di Nunno, G., Meyer-Brandis, T., Øksendal, B., Proske, F.: Malliavin calculus and
anticipative Itoˆ formulae for Le´vy processes. Inf. dim. Anal. Quant. Probab. 8, p. 235-
258 (2005).
[7] Di Nunno, G., Meyer-Brandis, T., Øksendal, B., Proske, F.: Optimal portfolio for an
insider in a market driven by Le´vy processes. Quant. Fin. 6 (1) p. 83-94 (2006).
[8] Di Nunno, G., Øksendal, B., Proske, F.: Malliavin Calculus for Le´vy Processes with
Applications to Finance. Universitext Springer, (2008).
[9] Di Nunno, G., Øksendal, B., Pamen, M. O., Proske, F.: Uniqueness of Decompositions
of Skorohod-Semimartingales. http://www.math.uio.no/eprint/pure math/2009/10-
09.pdf. Submitted (2009).
[10] Di Nunno, G., Øksendal, B., Pamen, M. O., Proske, F.: A general maximum principle
for anticipative stochastic control and applications to insider trading. Submitted (2009).
[11] Ewald, C-O., Xiao Y.: Information: Price and impact on general welfare and optimal
investment. An anticipating stochastic differential game model. Preprint (2007).
[12] Framstad, N., Øksendal, B., Sulem, A.: Stochastic maximum principle for optimal con-
trol of jump diffusions and applications to finance. J. Optimization Theory and Appl.
121 (1), p. 77-98 (2004). Errata: J.Optimization Theory and Appl. 124 (2), p. 511-512
(2005).
[13] Ghomrasni, R. and Pamen, O. M.: An approximation of the generalized covariation
process. Submitted (2008).
[14] Karatzas, I., Pikovsky, I.: Anticipating portfolio optimization. Adv. Appl. Probab. 28:
1095-1122 (1996).
[15] Kohatsu-Higa, A., Sulem, A.: Utility Maximization in an Insider Influenced Market.
Mathematical Finance. 16 (1), p. 153-179 (2006).
25
[16] Meyer-Brandis, T., Øksendal, B., Zhou, X.: A Malliavin calculus approach to a general
maximum principle for stochastic control. Submitted. Eprint, University of Oslo 10/2008.
[17] Nualart, D.: The Malliavin Calculus and Related Topics. Springer (1995).
[18] Nualart, D., Pardoux, E.: Stochastic calculus with anticipating integrands. Probability
Theory and Related Fields 78, 535-581 (1988).
[19] Nualart, D., U¨stu¨nel, A.S., Zakai, E.: Some Relations among Classes of σ-fields on
Wiener Space. Probability Theory and Related Fields 85, 119-119 (1990).
[20] Øksendal, B., Sulem, A.: Applied Stochastic Control of Jump Diffusions. Springer-
Verlag, Berlin, second edition, (2007).
[21] Russo, F., Vallois, P.: Forward, backward and symmetric stochastic integration. Proba-
bility Theory and Related Fields 97, p. 403-421 (1993).
[22] Russo, F., Vallois, P.: Stochastic calculus with respect to continuous finite variation
processes. Stochastics and Stochastics Reports 70, 1-40 (2000).
[23] Sato, Ken-iti.: Le´vy Processes and Infinitely Divisible Distributions. Volume 68 of
Cambridge Studies in Advanced Mathematics.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
(1999).
26
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof. The proof relies on a combination of arguments of [2] and [10].
(i) Suppose (pi, θ̂) ∈ AΠ×AΘ is a Nash equilibrium. Since 1 and 2 hold for all pi and θ, (pi, θ̂)
is a directional critical point for Ji(pi, θ) for i = 1, 2 in the sense that for all bounded
β ∈ AΠ and η ∈ AΘ, there exists δ > 0 such that pi + yβ ∈ AΠ, θ̂ + vη ∈ AΘ for all
y, v ∈ (−δ, δ). Then we have
0 =
∂
∂y
J1(pi + yβ, θ̂)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
(6.7)
=Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
∂
∂x
f1(t, X̂(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ̂0(t), θ̂1(t, z), z)
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(t)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
+ ∇pif1(t,X(pi,θ̂)(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ̂0(t), θ̂1(t, z), z)
∣∣∣
pi=pi
β∗(t)
}
µ(dz)dt
+ g′(X(T ))
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ)(t)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
]
=Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
∂
∂x
f1(t, X̂(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ̂0(t), θ̂1(t, z), z)Ŷ (t)
+ ∇pif1(t,X(pi,θ̂)(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ̂0(t), θ̂1(t, z), z)
∣∣∣
pi=pi
β∗(t)
}
µ(dz)dt
+ g′(X̂(T ))Ŷ (t)
]
Where
Ŷ (t) = Ŷβ(t) =
d
dy
X(pi+yβ,θ̂)(t)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
(6.8)
=
∫ t
0
{
∂
∂x
b(s, X̂(s), pi0(s), θ̂0(s))Y (s)
+ ∇pib(s,Xpi,θ̂(s), pi0(s), θ̂0(s))
∣∣∣
pi=pi
β∗(s)
}
ds
+
∫ t
0
{
∂
∂x
σ(s, X̂(s), pi0(s), θ̂0(s))Y (s)
+ ∇piσ(s,Xpi,θ̂(s), pi0(s), θ̂0(s))
∣∣∣
pi=pi
β∗(s)
}
dB−(s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
{
∂
∂x
γ(s, X̂(s−), pi0(s−), θ̂0(s−), z)Y (s)
+ ∇piγ(s,Xpi,θ̂(s−), pi0(s−), θ̂0(s−), z)
∣∣∣
pi=pi
β∗(s)
}
N˜(dz, d−s)
We study the three summands separately. Using the short notation ∂∂xf1(t, X̂(t), pi, θ̂, z) =
∂
∂xf1(t, z), ∇pif1(t,X(pi,θ̂)(t), pi, θ̂, z)
∣∣∣
pi=pi
and similarly for ∂∂xb, ∇pib, ∂∂xσ, ∇piσ, ∂∂xγ and
∇piγ.
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By the duality formulas (2.5) and (2.8) and the Fubini theorem, we get
E
[
g′1(X(T ))Y (T )
]
=E
[
g′1(X(T ))
(∫ T
0
{
∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) + ∇pib(t)β∗(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
{
∂σ
∂x
(t)Y (t) + ∇piσ(s)β∗(t)
}
d−B(t)
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
∂γ
∂x
(t, z1)Y (t) + ∇piγ(s, z1)β∗(t)
}
N˜(dz1, d−t)
)]
=E
[∫ T
0
g′1(X(T ))
{
∂b
∂x
(t)Y (t) + ∇pib(t)β∗(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
Dtg
′
1(X(T ))
{
∂σ
∂x
(t, z1)Y (t) + ∇piσ(t, z1)β∗(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
g′1(X(T ))Dt+
(
∂σ
∂x
(t)Y (t) + ∇piσ(t)β∗(t)
)
dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
Dt,z1g
′
1(X(T ))
{
∂γ
∂x
(t, z1)Y (t) + ∇piγ(t, z1)β∗(t)
}
ν(dz1)dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
g′1(X(T )) +Dt,z1g
′
1(X(T ))
}
Dt+,z1
(∂γ
∂x
(t, z1)Y (t)
+ ∇piγ(t, z1)β∗(t)
)
ν(dz1)dt
]
Changing notation z1 → z this becomes
=E
[∫ T
0
{
g′1(X(T ))
(
∂b
∂x
(t) +Dt+
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+Dtg′1(X(T ))
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zg
′
1(X(T ))
(
∂γ
∂x
(t, z) +Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
Y (t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
{
g′1(X(T ))
(
∇pib(t) +Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+Dtg′1(X(T ))∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zg
′
1(X(T )) (∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)) ν(dz)
}
β∗(t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
g′1(X(T ))
∂σ
∂x
(t)Dt+Y (t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
g′1(X(T ))∇piσ(t)Dt+β∗(t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
g′1(X(T )) +Dt,zg
′
1(X(T ))
}{∂γ
∂x
(t, z) + Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)
}
Dt+,zY (t)ν(dz)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
g′1(X(T )) +Dt,zg
′
1(X(T ))
} {∇piγ(t, z) + Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)}Dt+,zβ∗(t)ν(dz)dt] .
(6.9)
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Here we used the multidimensional product rule for Malliavin derivatives.
Similarly, we have using both Fubini and duality formulas (2.5) and (2.8), we get
Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)Y (t)µ(dz)dt
]
=Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)
(∫ t
0
{
∂b
∂x
(s)Y (s) + ∇pib(s)β∗(s)
}
ds
+
∫ t
0
{
∂σ
∂x
(s)Y (s) + ∇piσ(s)β∗(s)
}
d−B(s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
{
∂γ
∂x
(s, z1)Y (s) + ∇piγ(s, z1)
}
N˜(dz1, d−s)
)
dt
]
=Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(∫ t
0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)
{
∂b
∂x
(s)Y (s) + ∇pib(s)β∗(s)
}
ds
)
µ(dz)dt
]
+ Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(∫ t
0
Ds
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)
{
∂σ
∂x
(s)Y (s) + ∇piσ(s)β∗(s)
}
ds
)
µ(dz)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(∫ t
0
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)Ds+
{
∂σ(s)
∂x
Y (s) + ∇piσ(s)β∗(s)
}
ds
)
µ(dz)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(∫ t
0
∫
R0
Ds,z1
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)
{
∂γ
∂x
(s, z1)Y (s) + ∇piγ(s, z1)β∗(s)
}
ν(dz1)ds
)
µ(dz)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(∫ t
0
∫
R0
{
∂f1
∂x
(t, z) +Ds,z1
∂f1
∂x
(t, z)
}
×
Ds+,z1
(
∂γ
∂x
(s, z1)Y (s) + ∇piγ(s, z1)β(s)
)
ν(dz1)ds
)
µ(dz)dt
]
.
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Changing notation t1 → t and z1 → z this becomes
=Ex
[∫ T
0
{(∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)(
∂b
∂x
(t) +Dt+
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+
(∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)
∂σ
∂x
(t)
+
∫
R0
(∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt,z
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)(
∂γ
∂x
(t, z) +Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
Y (t)dt
]
+ Ex
[∫ T
0
{(∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)(
∇pib(t) +Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+
(∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)
∇piσ(t)
+
(∫ T
t
∫
R0
Dt,z
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
β∗(t)dt
]
+ Ex
[∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)
∂σ(t)
∂x
Dt+Y (t)dt
]
+ Ex
[∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)µ(dz)ds
)
∇piσ(t)Dt+β∗(t)dt
]
+ Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{∫ T
t
∫
R0
(
∂f
∂x
(s, z) +Dt,z
∂f
∂x
(s, z)
)
µ(dz)ds
}
×{
∂γ
∂x
(t) + Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t)
}
Dt+,zY (t)ν(dz)dt
]
+ Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{∫ T
t
∫
R0
(
∂f1
∂x
(s, z) +Dt,z
∂f1
∂x
(s, z)
)
µ(dz)ds
}
×{
∇piγ(t, z) + Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
}
Dt+,zβ
∗(t)ν(dz)dt
]
. (6.10)
Recall that
K(t) := g′1(X(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1)ds,
so
K̂1(t) := g′1(X̂(T )) +
∫ T
t
∫
R0
∂f1
∂x
(s, z1)µ(dz1)ds. (6.11)
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By combining (6.9)-(6.10), we get
0 =E
[∫ T
0
{
K̂1
(
∂b
∂x
(t) +Dt+
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+DtK̂1
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂1
(
∂γ
∂x
(t, z) +Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
Y (t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
{
K̂1
(
∇pib(t) +Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+DtK̂1∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂1
(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
β∗(t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
K̂1
∂σ(t)
∂x
Dt+Y (t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
K̂1∇piσ(t)Dt+β∗(t)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(
K̂1 +Dt,zK̂1
){∂γ
∂x
(t) + Dt+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t)
}
Dt+,zY (t)ν(dz)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
(
K̂1 +Dt,zK̂1
){
∇piγ(t, z) + Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
}
Dt+,zβ
∗(t)ν(dz)dt
]
+ E
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
∇pif1(t, z)β∗(t)µ(dz)dt
]
. (6.12)
Now apply this to β = βα ∈ AΠ given as βα(s) := αχ[t,t+h](s), for some t, h ∈ (0, T ), t+
h ≤ T , where α = α(ω) is bounded and G2t−measurable. Then Y (βα)(s) = 0 for
0 ≤ s ≤ t and hence (6.12) becomes
A1 +A2 +A3 +A4 +A5 +A6 = 0. (6.13)
Where
A1 =Ex
[∫ T
t
{
K̂1(t)
(
∂b
∂x
(s) +Ds+
∂σ
∂x
(s) +
∫
R0
Ds+,z
∂γ
∂x
(s, z)ν(dz)
)
+ DtK̂1(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK̂1(t)
(
∂γ
∂x
(s, z) +Ds+,z
∂γ
∂x
(s, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
Y (βα)(s) ds
]
,
A2 =Ex
[∫ t+h
t
{
K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(s) +Ds+∇piσ(s) +
∫
R0
Dts,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(s, z) +Ds,z∇piγ(s, z)
)
ν(dz) +
∫
R0
∇pif1(s, z)µ(dz)
}
αds
]
,
A3 =Ex
[∫ T
t
K̂1(t)
∂σ(s)
∂x
Ds+Y
(βα)(s) ds
]
,
A4 = + E
[∫ t+h
t
K̂1(t)∇piσ(s)Ds+αds
]
,
A5 =Ex
[∫ T
t
∫
R0
(
K̂1(t) +Ds,zK̂1(t)
){∂γ
∂x
(s) + Ds+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t)
}
ν(dz)Ds+,zY (βα)(s) ds
]
,
A6 =Ex
[∫ t+h
t
∫
R0
(
K̂1(t) +Ds,zK̂1(t)
){
∇piγ(s, z) + Ds+,z∇piγ(s, z)
}
ν(dz)Ds+,zαds
]
.
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Note by the definition of Y , with Y (s) = Y (βα)(s) and s ≥ t + h, the process Y (s)
follows the dynamics
dY (s) = Y (s−)
[
∂b
∂x
(s)ds +
∂σ
∂x
(s)d−B(s) +
∫
R0
∂θ
∂x
(s−, z)N˜(dz, d−s)
]
, (6.14)
for s,≥ t+h with initial condition Y (t+h) in time t+h. By the Itoˆ formula for forward
integrals, this equation can be solved explicitly and we get
Y (s) = Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s), s ≥ t+ h, (6.15)
where, in general, for s ≥ t,
G(t, s) := exp
(∫ s
t
{
∂b
∂x
(r)− 1
2
(
∂σ
∂x
)2
(r)
}
dr +
∫ s
t
∂σ
∂x
(r)dB−(r)
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r, z)
)
− ∂γ
∂x
(r, z)
}
ν(dz)dt
+
∫ s
t
∫
R0
{
ln
(
1 +
∂γ
∂x
(r−, z)
)}
N˜(dz, d−r)
)
.
Note that G(t, s) does not depend on h, but Y (s) does. Defining H10 as in (3.8), it
follows that
A1 = Ex
[∫ T
t
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
.
Where Ĥ10 (s) = H
1
0 (s, X̂(s), pi, θ̂).
Differentiating with respect to h at h = 0, we get
d
dh
A1
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=
d
dh
Ex
[∫ t+h
t
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
h=0
+
d
dh
Ex
[∫ T
t+h
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
h=0
.
Since Y (t) = 0, we see that
d
dh
Ex
[∫ t+h
t
∂H0
∂x
(s)Y (s)ds
]
h=0
= 0.
Therefore, by (6.15),
d
dh
A1
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=
d
dh
Ex
[∫ T
t+h
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s)ds
]
h=0
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s)
]
h=0
ds
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)G(t, s)Y (t+ h)
]
h=0
ds,
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where, Y (t+ h) is given by
Y (t+ h) =
∫ t+h
t
Y (r−)
[
∂b
∂x
(r)dr +
∂σ
∂x
(r)d−B(r) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(r−, z)N˜(dz, d−r)
]
+ α
∫ t+h
t
[
∇pib(r)dr + ∇piσ(r)d−B(r) +
∫
R0
∇piγ(r−, z)N˜(dz, d−r)
]
.
Therefore, by the two preceding equalities,
d
dh
A1
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=A1,1 +A1,2,
where
A1,1 =
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[
∂H0
∂x
(s)G(t, s)α
∫ t+h
t
{∇pib(r)dr + ∇piσ(r)d−B(r)
+
∫
R0
∇piγ(r−, z)N˜(dz, d−r)
}]
h=0
ds,
and
A1,2 =
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[
∂H0
∂x
(s)G(t, s)
∫ t+h
t
Y (r−)
{
∂b
∂x
(r)dr +
∂σ
∂x
(r)d−B(r)
+
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(r, z)N˜(dz, d−r)
}]
h=0
ds.
Applying again the duality formula, we have
A1,1 =
∫ T
t
d
dh
Ex
[
α
∫ t+h
t
{∇pib(r)F1(t, s) +∇piσ(r)DrF1(t, s)
+ F1(t, s)Dr+∇piσ(r) +
∫
R0
{(∇piγ(r, z) +Dr+,z∇piγ(r, z))Dr,zF1(t, s)
+ Dr+,z∇piγ(r, z)F1(t, s)
}
ν(dz)
}
dr
]
h=0
ds
=
∫ T
t
Ex
[
α
{(
∇pib(t) +Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
F1(t, s)
∇piσ(t)DtF1(t, s) +
∫
R0
(∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z))Dt,zF1(t, s)ν(dz)}] ds,
where we have put
F1(t, s) =
∂Ĥ10
∂x
(s)G(t, s).
Since Y (t) = 0 we see that
A1,2 = 0.
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We conclude that
d
dh
A1
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=A1,1 (6.16)
=
∫ T
t
E
[
α
{(
∇pib(t) +Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
F1(t, s)
+ ∇piσ(t)DtF1(t, s) +
∫
R0
(∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z))Dt,zF1(t, s)ν(dz)}] ds,
Moreover, we see that
d
dh
A2
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=E
[{
K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(t) + Dt+∇piσ(t) +
∫
R0
Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ ∇pif1(t) + DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Dt,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
α
]
, (6.17)
d
dh
A4
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=E
[
K̂1(t)∇piσ(t)Dt+α
]
, (6.18)
d
dh
A6
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=E
[∫
R0
{
K̂1(t) +Dt,zK̂1(t)
}(
∇piγ(t, z) +Dt+,z∇piγ(t, z)
)
ν(dz)Dt+,zα
]
.
(6.19)
On the other hand, differentiating A3 with respect to h at h = 0, we get
d
dh
A3
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=
d
dh
E
[∫ t+h
t
K̂1(s)
∂σ(s)
∂x
Ds+Y (s)ds
]
h=0
+
d
dh
E
[∫ T
t+h
K̂1(s)
∂σ(s)
∂x
Ds+Y (s)ds
]
h=0
.
Since Y (t) = 0, we see that
d
dh
A3
∣∣∣∣
h=0
=
d
dh
E
[∫ T
t+h
K̂1(s)
∂σ(s)
∂x
Ds+
(
Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s)
)
ds
]
h=0
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
E
[
K̂1(s)
∂σ(s)
∂x
Ds+
(
Y (t+ h)G(t+ h, s)
)]
h=0
ds
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
E
[
K̂1(s)
∂σ(s)
∂x
(
Ds+G(t+ h, s) · Y (t+ h)
+Ds+Y (t+ h) ·G(t+ h, s)
)]
h=0
ds
=
∫ T
t
d
dh
E
[
K̂1(s)
∂σ(s)
∂x
·Ds+Y (t+ h)G(t, s)
]
h=0
ds.
34
Using the definition of p̂ and Ĥ1 given respectively by (3.17) and (3.16) in the theorem,
it follows by (6.13) that
E
[
∇piĤ1(t, X̂(t), û(t))
∣∣∣G2t ] + E[A] = 0 a.e. in (t, ω), (6.20)
where
A =
d
dh
A3
∣∣∣∣
h=0
+
d
dh
A4
∣∣∣∣
h=0
+
d
dh
A5
∣∣∣∣
h=0
+
d
dh
A6
∣∣∣∣
h=0
. (6.21)
Similarly, we have
0 =
∂
∂v
J2(pi, θ̂ + vη)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
(6.22)
=Ex
[∫ T
0
∫
R0
{
∂
∂x
f2(t, X̂(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ̂0(t), θ̂1(t, z), z)V̂ (t)
+ ∇pif1(t,X(pi,θ)(t), pi0(t), pi1(t, z), θ0(t), θ1(t, z), z)
∣∣∣
θ̂=θ
η∗(t)
}
µ(dz)dt
+ g′(X̂(T ))V̂ (t)
]
,
where
V̂ (t) = V̂η(t) =
d
dv
X(pi,θ̂+vη)(t)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
(6.23)
=
∫ t
0
{
∂
∂x
b(s, X̂(s), pi0(s), θ̂0(s))V (s) + ∇pib(s,Xpi,θ(s), pi0(s), θ0(s))
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
η∗(s)
}
ds
+
∫ t
0
{
∂
∂x
σ(s, X̂(s), pi0(s), θ̂0(s))V (s) + ∇piσ(s,Xpi,θ(s), pi0(s), θ0(s))
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
η∗(s)
}
dB−(s)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
{
∂
∂x
γ(s, X̂(s−), pi0(s−), θ̂0(s−), z)V (s)
+ ∇piγ(s,Xpi,θ(s−), pi0(s−), θ0(s−), z)
∣∣∣
θ=θ̂
η∗(s)
}
N˜(dz, d−s).
Define
D(s) = D(t+ h)G(t+ h, s); s ≥ t+ h,
where G(t, s) is defined as in (3.20). Using similar arguments, we get
E
[
∇piĤ2(t, X̂(t), û(t))
∣∣∣G1t ] + E[B] = 0 a.e. in (t, ω),
where B is given in the same way as A.
This completes the proof of (i).
(ii) Conversely, suppose that there exist pi ∈ AΠ such that 3.14 holds. Then by reversing
the previous arguments, we obtain that 6.13 holds for all βα(s) := αχ[t,t+h](s ∈ AΠ),
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where
A1 =Ex
[∫ T
t
{
K̂1(t)
(
∂b
∂x
(s) +Ds+
∂σ
∂x
(s) +
∫
R0
Ds+,z
∂γ
∂x
(s, z)ν(dz)
)
+ DtK̂1(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK̂1(t)
(
∂γ
∂x
(s, z) +Ds+,z
∂γ
∂x
(s, z)
)
ν(dz)
}
Y (βα)(s) ds
]
,
A2 =Ex
[∫ t+h
t
{
K̂1(t)
(
∇pib(s) +Ds+∇piσ(s) +
∫
R0
Dts,z∇piγ(t, z)ν(dz)
)
+ DtK̂1(t)∇piσ(t)
+
∫
R0
Ds,zK̂1(t)
(
∇piγ(s, z) +Ds,z∇piγ(s, z)
)
ν(dz) +
∫
R0
∇pif1(s, z)µ(dz)
}
αds
]
,
A3 =Ex
[∫ T
t
K̂1(t)
∂σ(s)
∂x
Ds+Y
(βα)(s) ds
]
,
A4 = + E
[∫ t+h
t
K̂1(t)∇piσ(s)Ds+αds
]
,
A5 =Ex
[∫ T
t
∫
R0
(
K̂1(t) +Ds,zK̂1(t)
){∂γ
∂x
(s) + Ds+,z
∂γ
∂x
(t)
}
ν(dz)Ds+,zY (βα)(s) ds
]
,
A6 =Ex
[∫ t+h
t
∫
R0
(
K̂1(t) +Ds,zK̂1(t)
){
∇piγ(s, z) + Ds+,z∇piγ(s, z)
}
ν(dz)Ds+,zαds
]
,
for some t, h ∈ (0, T ), t + h ≤ T , where α = α(ω) is bounded and G2t−measurable.
Hence, these equalities hold for all linear combinations of βα. Since all bounded β ∈ AΠ
can be approximated pointwise boundedly in (t, ω) by such linear combinations, it
follows that 6.13 holds for all bounded β ∈ AΠ. Hence, by reversing the remaining part
of the previous proof, we conclude that
∂J1
∂y
(pi + yβ, θ̂)
∣∣∣∣
y=0
= 0, for all β.
Similarly, suppose that there exist θ̂ ∈ AΘ such that 3.15 holds. Then, the above
argument leads us to conclude that
∂J2
∂v
(pi, θ̂ + vη)
∣∣∣∣
v=0
= 0, for all η.
On the other hand, assume moreover that pi → J1(pi, θ̂), then
0 =
1
y
(
J1(pi + yβ, θ̂)− J1(pi, θ̂)
)
=
1
y
(
J1(1− y pi1− y + yβ, θ̂)− J1(pi, θ̂)
)
≥ 1
y
(
(1− y)J1( pi1− y , θ̂) + yJ1(β, θ̂)− J1(pi, θ̂)
)
=
1
y
(
J1(
pi
1− y , θ̂)− J1(pi, θ̂)
)
+ J1(β, θ̂)− J1( pi1− y , θ̂).
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Taking the limit for y → 0, and using the fact that lim
y→0
1
y
(
J1( pi1−y , θ̂)− J1(pi, θ̂)
)
= 0, we
obtain that 0 ≥ J1(β, θ̂) − J1(pi, θ̂). Since β can be chosen within the set Api, we obtain by
formally setting β = pi that
J1(pi, θ̂) ≤ J1(pi, θ̂) for all pi ∈ Api (6.24)
Analogously, we obtain
J2(pi, θ) ≤ J1(pi, θ̂) for all θ ∈ Aθ (6.25)
This means that (pi, θ̂) is a Nash-equilibrium for the market. is concave in each pi or θ This
complete the proof.
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